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Abstract 
Objective: To study decision-making by detectives when investigating serious 
crime through the examination of Decision Logs to explore hypothesis generation and 
evidence selection.  
Background: Decision logs are used to record and justify decisions made 
during serious crime investigations. The complexity of investigative decision-making 
is well documented, as are the errors associated with miscarriages of justice and 
inquests.  The use of decision logs has not been the subject of an empirical 
investigation, yet they offer an important window into the nature of investigative 
decision-making in dynamic, time-critical environments.  
Method: A sample of decision logs from British police forces was analyzed 
qualitatively and quantitatively to explore hypothesis generation and evidence 
selection by police detectives. 
Results: Analyses revealed diversity in documentation of decisions that did 
not correlate with case type, and identified significant limitations of the decision log 
approach to supporting investigative decision-making. Differences emerged between 
experienced and less experienced officers’ decision log records in exploration of 
alternative hypotheses, generation of hypotheses, and sources of evidential enquiry 
opened over phase of investigation. 
Conclusion: The practical use of decision logs is highly constrained by their 
format and context of use. Despite this, decision log records suggest that experienced 
detectives display strategic decision-making to avoid confirmation and satisficing that 
affect less experienced detectives.  
Application. Potential applications of this research include both training in 
case documentation and the development of new decision log media that encourage 
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detectives, irrespective of experience, to generate multiple hypotheses and optimize 
the timely selection of evidence to test them.  
 
Key Words: Decision Logs; Crime Investigation; Heuristics & Biases; Hypothesis 
Generation; Expertise. 
Precis: Decision Logs from British police forces were analyzed to explore hypothesis 
generation and evidence selection by senior detectives. Significant limitations of the 
decision log approach to supporting investigative decision-making emerged. There 
were differences between experienced and less experienced officers’ use of decision 
logs for triggering the generation and testing of hypotheses.  
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Introduction 1 
Police decision making is under-researched, and so is not well understood. 2 
One starting point is to look at the records they make during investigations. Police 3 
detectives in the United Kingdom are accountable for their decisions and have to 4 
provide a mandatory record of what they did in sequentially numbered books called 5 
‘Decision Logs’ (e.g. see Figure 1). These are auditable, hard-copy documents used to 6 
record, justify, and share decisions made during serious crime investigations (ACPO 7 
Crime Committee, 1999; College of Policing, 2014). Each decision is entered on a 8 
separate page and every decision is timed, dated, and signed by the officer making the 9 
decision. Although guides to best practice exist (e.g., the UK ‘Investigative Doctrine’ 10 
- ACPO, 2006), there is no gold standard against which to compare performance. The 11 
UK College of Policing (the professional body for policing in the UK) has recently 12 
adopted a National Decision Model (NDM) ‘to help everyone in policing make 13 
decisions’. NDM is descriptive and procedural, comprising six key elements to be 14 
considered when making all decisions. However, NDM does not specifically 15 
encourage the generation and testing of hypotheses, and so is likely to result in a 16 
preponderance of procedural decisions (i.e., formulaic decisions that follow expected 17 
practice). While prescription is, to some extent, unavoidable, the need to generate and 18 
test alternative hypotheses is also important to the investigative process.  19 
The complexity of investigative decision-making is widely recognised (e.g., 20 
Alison et al., 2014; Eyre & Alison, 2007; Schulenberg, 2014; van den Heuvel, Alison, 21 
& Power, 2014; Vickers & Lewinski, 2012), as are errors emerging from miscarriages 22 
of justice and serious case reviews (e.g., Ellison & Morgan, 2015; Leo, 2008). 23 
Recently, the UK Home Affairs Select Committee (2011) raised concerns over 24 
decisions made during public order incidents in August 2011, and a serious case 25 
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review concerning the murder of a teenage girl revealed erroneous decision-making 26 
and decision avoidance (West Mercia Police, 2015). Here, we report a study of 27 
decision logs, which reveals significant limitations of decision logs for supporting 28 
crime investigation. The study also explored the presence of biases in decision log 29 
records that have been shown in other domains to affect hypothesis generation and 30 
testing.  31 
 32 
Figure 1. Example of a decision log 33 
 34 
The Nature of Investigative Decision-Making 35 
A simple characterization of investigating serious crimes is as a task with two 36 
components: hypothesis generation (e.g., determining modus operandi, identifying 37 
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suspects), and hypothesis testing (e.g., seeking evidence concerning crime scenes, 38 
alibis and other sources). Decision-making tasks such as these can be subject to the 39 
use of cognitive heuristics that are known to cause biases in responses (e.g., Tversky 40 
& Kahneman, 1973), and it is the impacts of these biases that concern us here. 41 
One such heuristic is ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1956, 1990), where individuals 42 
limit the space of possible ideas that must be searched for a solution by generating a 43 
single solution idea that is satisfactory and suffices (hence ‘satisficing’) to meet the 44 
current goal. This reduces cognitive load, but may not give the optimal solution.  45 
Theoretical analyses typically suggest that an optimal approach to hypothesis 46 
generation is to conduct an exhaustive search for as many hypotheses as possible 47 
(e.g., King et al., 2004). As noted in the ACPO (2006) Investigative Doctrine, 48 
investigating officers should consider all possible explanations for any crime or 49 
evidence set. In the domain of investigation, the effect of satisficing is to limit the 50 
hypotheses generated by investigators, typically to those that most obviously or 51 
immediately explain the available evidence.  The effect of satisficing, therefore, goes 52 
against the prescriptively optimal approach of generating alternative hypotheses as 53 
exhaustively as possible.  54 
Evidence for satisficing can be found in a range of domains. For example, 55 
automobile mechanics, irrespective of expertise, were found to generate fewer than 56 
one fifth of possible hypotheses, despite being confident their explanations were 57 
exhaustive (Mehle, 1982). In an investigative domain, Fahsing and Ask (2016) found 58 
that police officers generated only 50% of the hypotheses subsequently identified as 59 
representing a gold standard for each case they examined. Here, the ‘gold standard’ 60 
comprised all the hypotheses that should be considered for any specific evidence set 61 
for a presented case, and was established by a panel of senior police investigators.  62 
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The impact of satisficing on investigative hypothesis generation has been 63 
found to be affected by expertise, but not always in a straightforward way. Wright 64 
(2013) found that inexperienced UK police officers were more likely than 65 
experienced officers to fixate on single explanations of crimes, yet Fahsing and Ask 66 
(2016) found the opposite result with Norwegian police officers. Alison and 67 
colleagues (2013) reported that perceived time pressure rather than experience 68 
reduced the generation of investigative hypotheses. Sandham (2013) found that both 69 
inexperienced and experienced police officers failed to generate all possible 70 
hypotheses consistent with the presence of a piece of evidence whose validity was 71 
uncertain, and were more likely to generate hypotheses consistent with the guilt of a 72 
person of interest. Her results are consistent with truth and lie response biases 73 
typically found with general public and law enforcement participant groups, 74 
respectively). Truth bias is a default position adopted whereby people tend to believe 75 
accounts of others, whereas law enforcement officers have a tendency to disbelieve 76 
what they are told.  (e.g., Meissener, & Kasin, 2002; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 77 
2009) 78 
Just as cognitive heuristics can affect hypothesis generation, the biases they 79 
produce are also evident in hypothesis testing. The prescriptively optimal approach to 80 
hypothesis testing is agreed to be hypothetico-deductive falsification (e.g., Tarantola, 81 
2006; Magee, 2013), in which evidence is sampled to try to disconfirm the current 82 
hypothesis, the corollary being a failure to disconfirm provides corroborative support. 83 
However, empirical studies suggest that individuals demonstrate ‘confirmation’ bias 84 
(Wason, 1966): a tendency to seek or accept evidence supporting the current 85 
hypothesis. Ask and Granhag (2005) found both naïve individuals and law 86 
enforcement personnel showed confirmation bias when sampling evidence to test 87 
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hypotheses, but experienced investigators were affected by a guilt bias, an involuntary 88 
or automatic tendency to assume guilt (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2001; Meissner 89 
& Kassin, 2002). The effect of guilt bias was to reduce the impact of confirmation 90 
bias on hypothesis testing, where confirming evidence might exonerate the person of 91 
interest. Confirmation and guilt biases may occur because of an overarching 92 
‘availability’ bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), in which investigators make 93 
decisions based on how easily examples from previous experience come to mind. In 94 
medical diagnosis, the order in which pieces of evidence are presented influences 95 
final diagnosis, with early disease-indicative evidence dominating decisions even 96 
when undermined by later evidence (Chapman, Bergus, & Elstein, 1996; Rebitschek, 97 
Krems, & Jahn, 2015). Like confirmation bias, order effects arising through 98 
availability can impair the sampling of evidence to test investigative hypotheses. 99 
Empirical evidence for biases in hypothesis generation and testing typically 100 
comes from laboratory studies. However, naturalistic methods sometimes refute the 101 
presence of systematic bias in performance. For example, Hutchins (1995) found 102 
individual’s overconfidence bias all but disappears in collaborative task performance. 103 
Mossmann (2013) investigated the decisions made by forensic examiners and reported 104 
random decision making errors rather than systematic bias. Ball, Maskill, and 105 
Ormerod (1998) found little evidence for satisficing strategies in idea generation 106 
behaviours of experienced designers. Likewise, experienced insurance fraud 107 
investigators pursued multiple hypotheses in parallel (Ormerod, Barrett, & Taylor, 108 
2008) as did doctors when making diagnostic decisions (Alby, Zucchermaglio, & 109 
Baruzzo, 2015). Decision making in natural settings can differ markedly from typical 110 
laboratory research because it rarely occurs in sanitized contexts, and is often 111 
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mediated by factors such as colleagues/team members and technology (Blumenthal-112 
Barby & Krieger, 2015).     113 
We examined decision logs to understand whether crime investigators reveal 114 
satisficing and confirmation biases in their records. We summarised different types of 115 
log entry, looking at how decision log structure interacts with the nature of the crime, 116 
and how log characteristics vary across individuals, and as a function of investigative 117 
experience. We then analysed a set of case exemplars. Finally, we explored records of 118 
generation and testing of investigative hypotheses and evidence, examining whether 119 
there was evidence for satisficing and confirmation biases. 120 
Methods 121 
Summarisation and Data Reduction 122 
Sixty decision logs were randomly selected from the repositories of two UK 123 
police forces blind to the research aims. The authors worked independently to identify 124 
entries as ‘decisions’ using the following criteria, which all had to be present: i) 125 
entries concerned the crime itself, ii) the detective had made clear a preference of 126 
possible action, and iii) a reason was given to follow the course of action. Twelve 127 
randomly selected decision logs (20%) were passed to two independent researchers 128 
for recoding. Inter-rater reliability, assessed for each decision log independently by 129 
comparing codes supplied by each rater to each entry (decision; not decision), 130 
revealed highly significant levels of agreement for the number of decisions in all logs, 131 
all Kappas > .935, all ps < .001. 132 
Exploration of Investigative Decisions 133 
We conducted a detailed exploration of the timeline of investigative decision-134 
making in the logs, illustrating key recurring themes with reference to three case 135 
exemplars, changing nothing in the reported decisions except to ensure anonymity. 136 
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We drew case timelines plotting the generation and testing of hypotheses against 137 
evidence collection over time (Table 1).  138 
 139 
Table 1.   140 
Case timelines plotting the generation and testing of hypotheses against evidence 141 
collection over time for Case Study 2: Stranger murder.  142 
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Using a Grounded Theory approach (e.g., Charmaz & Henwood, 2007), we 144 
identified key moments in a decision log where the course of an investigation changed 145 
(‘tipping points’, according to Fahsing & Ask, 2016). We examined these points for 146 
recurrent behaviours associated with hypothesis generation and evidence selection. 147 
Counts of Hypothesis Generation and Testing 148 
Logs were then examined to identify the numbers of distinct hypotheses 149 
generated, the amount of evidence sources examined in order to test these hypotheses, 150 
and the order in which they were generated. These counts were taken from a 151 
representation of the hypotheses and evidence referred to in each log using problem 152 
behaviour graphs (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), in which top-level hypotheses are 153 
considered as problem goals and sub-hypotheses that relate to the top-level hypothesis 154 
are connected by branches from this node. Representing hypotheses as a problem 155 
behaviour graph enables a definition of rules as to what determines a new hypothesis 156 
distinct from previously generated ones, and facilitates tracking of hypothesis 157 
generation and testing. Figure 2 illustrates a problem behaviour graph for the 158 
‘Stranger murder’ described below (Case Study 2).  159 
Once the first hypothesis is created, distinct hypotheses are either added at the 160 
same level in a breadth-first expansion of the graph, or as variants of that initial 161 
hypothesis in a depth-first expansion of the graph. Thus, we defined a hypothesis as a 162 
distinct addition to the graph under the following coding rules: 163 
1. If it established a new line of investigation.  For instance, “The victim was 164 
murdered” and “The victim suffered accidental death” are distinct hypotheses 165 
at the same level; 166 
2. If it modified an existing hypothesis with a new line of enquiry. For example, 167 
if a previously mentioned hypothesis was “The victim was assaulted by an 168 
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unknown is a distinct hypothesis below the level of the hypothesis “The victim 169 
was murdered” and at the same level as the previously mentioned hypothesis; 170 
3. If it extended an existing hypothesis with a more focused line of enquiry. For 171 
example, if a previous hypothesis was “the victim was assaulted by an 172 
unknown assailant”, and a new hypothesis stated “the victim was assaulted by 173 
unknown male assailant”, then the latter became a new node at a level below 174 
the previous hypothesis. 175 
4. Counts were made of the number of entries in a decision log showing 176 
transitions horizontally or vertically between hypotheses, following the 177 
method of Ball & Ormerod (1995). A ratio of horizontal to vertical transitions 178 
greater than 1 indicates consideration of multiple alternative hypotheses in 179 
parallel, while a ratio less than 1 indicates satisficing behaviour.  180 
 181 
Figure 2. Hypothesis generation graph (example from Case Study 2). The top level 182 
hypothesis “Unexplained death” has two alternative hypotheses in the decision log: 1. 183 
Murder and 2. Accident. Each of these in turn has a number of hypotheses associated 184 
with it. 185 
 186 
 187 
Unexplained death
1. Murder 2. Accident
1.1. Stranger 
Murder
1.2. Known 
assailant
1.1.1. Failed robbery
2.1. Post-accident 
robbery
2.2. Fall onto 
stone
2.2.2 Fall after 
heart attack
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Strategies for hypothesis generation and testing are likely to change over time, 188 
since different phases of an investigation yield different amounts of evidence and 189 
investigative activity. To examine whether generation of hypotheses, opening of 190 
evidence sources, and activity transitions varied over time, we counted these items 191 
across four quartiles, each containing 25% of the log entries for each case. We divided 192 
quartiles by number of entries rather than time because the time-course of 193 
investigations is highly variable, and affected by non-investigatively relevant factors 194 
(e.g. staff availability, courts processes, delays in evidence processing). In choosing 195 
entry counts as a metric for sectioning the logs, we aimed to capture the fact that all 196 
investigations will have initial and end phases with at least one interim phase.  197 
In addition, we examined whether the number of years of experience in 198 
leading investigations would impact the use of decision logs. Seven officers had 199 
experience of five years or more (M = 10.40 years, ranging from 5 to 16 years), while 200 
the remainder (7) had experience of three years or less (M = 2.00 years, ranging from 201 
1 to 3 years). Thus, data analysed were the average numbers of hypotheses generated, 202 
evidence sources opened, and activity transitions made by each SIO in each quartile 203 
averaged across cases in which they were involved. 204 
Results 205 
Case Summarization 206 
Table 2 shows the total number of decision logs and crime types, and mean 207 
number of decisions and SIOs. A multinomial logistic regression was conducted to 208 
examine whether case type predicted number of investigation days, number of log 209 
entries or number of SIOs, but the model was not significant, χ2(4) = 0.91, p = .412. 210 
The mean number of entries made for each week of a case by experienced 211 
investigators (M entries = 8.19, SD = 4.13) and less experience investigators (M entries = 212 
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9.62, SD = 3.30) did not differ significantly, t = 1.14, p = .445, d = .31. Nor did the 213 
mean number of words per entry (M experienced SIO words  = 36.62, SD = 21.12; M less 214 
experienced SIO words = 29.59, SD = 23.50), t < 1. 215 
 216 
Table 2. 217 
Total number of decision logs and crime types, and mean number of decisions and 218 
senior investigating officers.  219 
 220 
Exploration of Investigative decisions 221 
A number of themes emerged across the cases, which can be divided into two 222 
categories: modifiers of decision-log entry frequency and type, which we describe 223 
with reference to the whole sample; and themes about hypothesis generation and 224 
testing, which we illustrate with reference to three case studies. 225 
One unexpected factor that appeared to increase duration and number of case 226 
log entries was when a case raised major social and behavioural side-issues. As an 227 
extreme example, our biggest case (200+ logs extending over three case booklets) was 228 
an aggravated breach of an Anti-Social Behaviour Order involving two warring 229 
families.  Whereas murder enquiries tend to take longer than aggravated 230 
burglary/Grievous Bodily Harm enquiries, the latter tended to have more entries 231 
Crime Type
Number of Logs 
Analyzed*
Number of 
Investigation Days
 Total Number of 
Log Entries 
Number of SIOs
Murder 28 86.86 (SD = 61.03) 86.14 (SD = 34.24) 3.20 (SD = 1.23)
Aggravated Burglary 11 66.34 (SD = 23.54) 84.45 (SD = 87.21) 1.70 (SD = 0.41)
Sexual Offences 12 35.68 (SD = 12.34) 34.45 (SD = 14.30) 1.90 (SD = 1.12)
Arson 4 78.43 (SD = 23.24) 88.32 (SD = 101.65) 2.30 (SD = 2.42)
Other 5 101.43 (SD = 64.71) 122.40 (SD = 133.20) 4.43 (SD = 4.56)
* Each case has one continuous decision log
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concerning social/behavioural issues (e.g., mental health, witness protection) and so 232 
generated much more variability in the number of decisions that were logged.  In 233 
contrast, the sexual assault cases we looked at generated fewer log entries, but tended 234 
to involve unknown or unrelated assailants, which we suspect is not a particularly 235 
representative sample of sexual assault cases.  236 
As one might expect, the average number of SIOs involved varied with case 237 
type and complexity, with murder enquiries typically having more SIOs than 238 
aggravated burglary.  Sometimes SIOs changed due to availability (e.g., vacations), 239 
but sometimes were changed by tactical decisions made by commanding officers.  240 
Changes in SIO were frequently marked by a set of review logs, made as part of the 241 
handover.  As case study 2 below illustrates, these change-over moments were often 242 
key change points in the direction of investigations. 243 
Three case studies illustrate key themes in the decision logs concerning 244 
hypothesis generation and testing.    245 
Case study 1: Drive-by murder. This case involved a revenge killing 246 
between gangs, which took place in a busy public place in broad daylight. A single 247 
SIO was assigned the case throughout the three-week investigation. Table 3 shows 248 
two log entries recorded at key moments in the investigation.  249 
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Table 3. 250 
Decision log entries for Case study 1: shooting 251 
 252 
The first (entry no. 4) was made 1 hour 40 minutes after the incident was first 253 
reported. The initial hypothesis reported (that the incident is a drive-by shooting) 254 
turned out to be correct, and influenced the following 20 log entries, recorded over 24 255 
hours. However, the next day, the detective documented his investigative strategy 256 
(entry no. 24), where he explored complexities surrounding the initial intelligence, 257 
which implicitly set up the consideration of motives for the shooting. This led him to 258 
flesh out different hypotheses that the investigation needed to entertain.  259 
This generation of multiple hypotheses appears to alert the SIO to the 260 
importance of undertaking victimology research via the victim’s partner and other 261 
associates, partly to rule out the possibility that the shooting was a result of something 262 
other than a revenge attack (hypothesis 3 shown in Log 24 allows that it is a deliberate 263 
Log 
Entry No
Time of 
Decision 
(Post 
notification 
of crime)
Decision Rational
4 1 Hour 40 
mins
Major Incident - Use Home Office 
Large Major Enquiry System
Given that the incident appears to be a 
'stranger type' murder, Cat B, a significant 
amount of evidence is expected to be 
gathered…
24 24 Hours At this time  the motives for this 
death are unknown...Initial 
intelligence shows there is acrimony 
between Gang A to whom the victim 
belonged and Gang B. Approx. 2 
months ago a tattoo parlour was 
targeted by arsonists…the tattoo 
parlour was the premises used by 
Gang B. Furthermore, there was a 
road rage attack (X days ago) on 
XXXX who was affiliated to Gang B
A number of hypotheses exist at this time:                                                
1) non-discriminatory shooting by other 
XXXX, 2) non-discriminatory shooting by 
others not associated to the XXXX, 3) 
deliberate shooting of XXXX by XXXX or 
otherwise because of the victim's personal 
lifestyle, 4) deliberate shooting of XXXX                                                               
by XXXX or otherwise because of his 
affiliation to XXXX believed to be Gang A
Analysing investigative decision logs 
 18 
shooting by ‘others’ because of lifestyle, e.g., a personal relationship motive). Thus, 264 
the course of the investigation was influenced by widening the scope of evidence 265 
sought, and allowed collection of evidence to test the initial hypothesis of a revenge 266 
attack. Here we see how evidence can serve both confirmatory and disconfirmatory 267 
roles if selected appropriately. The SIO assigned this case was the most experienced 268 
in our sample (>16 years).  269 
Case study 2: “Stranger murder”. A man was found dead in a local park, 270 
with head injuries from a blunt instrument. Representing the case along a timeline 271 
reveals satisficing in the initial investigation. The case timeline shows initial 272 
consideration of a failed robbery, but once the idea was generated that this was a 273 
stranger murder (a general case of the failed robbery hypothesis), no other hypothesis 274 
was entertained for a considerable time. Even when a pathologist reported that 275 
wounds were consistent with a fall, generating an implicit hypothesis that it might be 276 
an accident, the only hypothesis that continued to be entertained was stranger murder.  277 
Indeed, the accident hypothesis was not stated explicitly in the log; instead the SIO 278 
made a note that the pathologist’s contribution was unreliable and should be ignored. 279 
The logs to this point are consistent with the effect of a confirmation bias limiting the 280 
consideration of evidence that might pertain to alternative explanations of the 281 
incident. 282 
A switch in SIO led to a change in investigative stance. The new SIO was 283 
relatively inexperienced (< 2 years), but had served under the SIO responsible for the 284 
successful drive-by shooting investigation. He introduced an immediate note of 285 
circumspection, illustrated by log 11, shown in Table 4. In log 20a, 21 hours after the 286 
incident, he explicitly states multiple hypotheses. In log 21, he notes, in stark contrast 287 
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to earlier investigation, that the cause of death is unknown.  In fact, the final 288 
investigation outcome was of death by accident with no robbery having taken place.  289 
 290 
Table 4.  291 
Decision log entries for Case study 2: stranger murder 292 
 293 
Case study 3: Disappearance. This case was the longest in the sample, 294 
lasting over two years, in which a woman initially reported missing by her husband 295 
became a murder enquiry. Investigators focused for nearly two years upon a single 296 
hypothesis, that the husband had killed and disposed of the victim’s body. Although 297 
the hypothesis was in the end correct, the breakthrough in the investigation occurred 298 
only when an SIO re-evaluated evidence collected after the investigation had faltered 299 
with no action taken for nearly a year. A visit by UK police to the victim’s country of 300 
Log 
Entry No
Time of 
Decision 
(Post 
notification 
of crime)
Decision Rational
11 10 Hours Major Incident - Use Home Office 
Large Major Enquiry System
At this stage there has been no formal 
identification of the deceased, we have no 
suspects, and are uncertain of cause
20a 20 Hours Mature Assessment' (where the facts 
are clear the SIO undertakes a 
mature assessment, assessing the 
broader range of investiagtive issues 
to determine the appropriate level of 
resources that are required from that 
time) 
There are various hypotheses being 
considered: 1) this was a deliberate act 
…pushing the injured party onto a pointed 
object... being forced into his neck…part of a 
robbery; 2) the injured party fell on two 
occasions accounting for his 
injuries…property has been mislaid, not 
theft 3) the injured party fell on two 
occasions...he has had his property stolen 
from him when he was on the ground
21 21 Hours Investigation to be conducted with 
the same resources at this time as a 
murder
The action to cause death is not clear 
…subject of a deliberate push or a fall
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residence triggered a review of the evidence, which noted evidence pertaining to 301 
witnesses A1 and A2, shown in Table 5.  302 
The recording of this evidence in the decision log (even though it had been 303 
available elsewhere for some time) is important, since it triggered a change in the 304 
investigation. In particular, the ‘rationale’ given in Log 27 contains a contradiction 305 
made explicit by recording it: why would the husband enquire about his wife’s 306 
whereabouts and then tell them she had gone to see a friend who lived elsewhere in 307 
the country? This record triggered a declaration of the husband as a suspect, and is the 308 
‘information’ referred to in Log entry 34 (see Table 5). The act of documenting 309 
information made the anomaly in the husband’s behaviour more prominent, providing 310 
the first strong evidence of an inconsistency in his account.  311 
 312 
Table 5. 313 
Decision log entries for Case Study 3: Disappearance 314 
 315 
Analysis of Hypothesis Generation and Testing Counts 316 
 To investigate hypothesis generation and testing counts we conducted a series 317 
Log 
Entry No
Time of 
Decision 
(Post 
notification 
of crime)
Decision Rational
27 10 Months Persons A1 & A2 to be treated as 
significant witnesses
A1 & A2 have significant information about 
the victim including a phone call made to 
them by XXXX enquiring into his wife's 
whereabouts and then telling them that she 
had gone to see a 'friend' in Benidorm
34 11 Months 2 
weeks
XXXX to be declared a suspect…his 
arrest will take place when deemed 
appropriate
Information exists that demonstrates that 
spouse may be responsible for victim's 
disappearance/murder... 
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of inferential statistical analyses as a function of experience, followed by post hoc t-318 
test pairwise comparisons, applying Bonferroni correction.    319 
A significant effect of quartile was found in hypothesis generation, F(1.60, 320 
19.25) = 25.53, p < .001, η 2 = .68. More hypotheses were generated in quartile 1 (M1st 321 
= 2.11, SE = .25; 95% CI [1.57, 2.66]), p < .001, than in quartiles 2 (M2nd  = .89, SE = 322 
.10; 95% CI [.68, 1.11]), p < .001, d = .91, 3 (M3rd  = .65, SE = .06; 95% CI [.53, .78]), 323 
p < .001, d = .78, and 4 (M4th  = .69, SE = .09; 95% CI [.48, .89]), p < .001, d = .77. 324 
No other pairwise comparisons were significant, all ps > .310.  325 
There was a significant effect of experience, F(1, 12) = 9.08, p = .011, η 2 = 326 
.43. Experienced detectives documented more hypotheses (M> 5 years = 1.34, SE = .12; 327 
95% CI [1.08, 1.60]) than less experienced (M< 3 years = 0.83, SE = .12; 95% CI [0.58, 328 
1.09]), p = .003.  329 
Figure 3. Mean hypotheses reported as a function of SIO experience (< 3 330 
years; > 5 years) across decision log quartiles (bars show between subjects 95% 331 
confidence intervals).  332 
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The experience X quartile interaction was significant, F(1.60, 19.25) = 6.97 , p 335 
= .008, η 2 = .37. More hypotheses were documented by experienced than 336 
inexperienced detectives (see Fig. 3 above) in quartiles 1, p = .011, d = .92, and 2, p = 337 
.038, d = 1.09, with no significant difference between groups in quartiles 3 and 4, ps > 338 
.215. 339 
Evidence Sources 340 
A significant effect of quartile for evidence sources emerged, F(1.95, 23.34) = 341 
24.60, p < .001, η 2 = .67. More evidence sources were opened in quartile 1 (M1st  = 342 
3.53, SE = .33; 95% CI [2.82, 4.24])  than in quartiles 2 (M2nd  = 1.80 SE = .16; 95% 343 
CI [1.45, 2.15]), p = .013, d = 1.11, 3 (M3rd  = 1.90, SE = .31; 95% CI [1.23, 2.57]), p 344 
= .011, d = .96,  and 4 (M4th  = .1.55, SE = .10; 95% CI [1.32, 1.77]), p =.009, d = 345 
1.01. No other comparisons were significant, ps > 0.411. The main effect of 346 
experience was non-significant, F < 1.  347 
 348 
Figure 4. Mean number of evidence sources opened as a function of SIO experience 349 
group (<3 years; > 5 years) across decision log quartiles (bars show between subjects 350 
95% confidence intervals). 351 
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The interaction between experience and quartile was significant, F(1.95, 353 
23.34) = 5.72, p = .010, η 2 = .32. More sources (see Fig. 4 above) were opened by 354 
less experienced detectives in quartiles 1, p = .011, d = .2.23, and 2, p = .015. d = 355 
1.09, Experienced officers opened more sources in quartile 4, p = .019, d = 2.11, with 356 
no difference in quartile 3, p = .712. Less experienced officers sampled the evidence 357 
space more at the start of the investigation, while more experienced officers tended to 358 
sample towards the end of an investigation. 359 
Vertical Activity Transitions 360 
For horizontal to vertical activity transitions, the main effects of quartile, F(3, 361 
36) = 1.35, p < .274, and experience, F(1, 12) = 3.43, p = .090, were non-significant. 362 
The quartile X experience interaction was significant, F(3, 36) = 3.63, p = .02, η 2 = 363 
.23.  364 
 365 
Figure 5. Mean ratio of horizontal to vertical activity transitions as a function of 366 
experience group (<3 years; >5 years) across decision log quartiles (bars show 367 
between subjects 95% confidence intervals).   368 
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A larger ratio of horizontal to vertical activity transitions by experienced 370 
investigators emerged in quartiles 1, p = .004, d = .84, and 4, p = .006, d = .91, with 371 
no difference between groups in quartiles 2 and 3 (see Figure 5), ps> .452. 372 
Experienced officers switched across numerous hypotheses early and late suggesting a 373 
greater exploration of the hypothesis space, than less experienced officers.  374 
Discussion 375 
The summarization data indicate no clear relationship between decision log 376 
entries and factors such as crime type or duration of investigation. Detectives varied 377 
in the entries they made, some diligently documenting all hypotheses and evidence, 378 
others making scant records, but entries did not differ in frequency or length 379 
according to experience.  This suggests that there are factors affecting the use of 380 
decision logs that reflect individual differences such as diligence and commitment to 381 
documentation. Despite being a legal requirement, there is clearly a large degree of 382 
discretion available to SIOs in the extent to which they document their thinking and 383 
decisions. However, some regularities are apparent in decision logs. Entries suggest 384 
that satisficing and confirmation biases do affect police investigations, but increasing 385 
expertise overcomes these biases to some extent. Experienced SIOs documented twice 386 
as many hypotheses as less experienced officers in the first two quartiles of decision 387 
logs.  388 
Analysis of documented evidence sources also shows an effect of experience, 389 
Less experienced detectives documented more new evidence sources in quartiles 1 390 
and 2 than more experienced detectives.  Our interpretation of this finding, confirmed 391 
by inspection of the logs and the timelines for each case is that less experienced 392 
detectives tended to gather as much evidence as they could as quickly and as they 393 
could that corroborated a particular hypothesis. This behaviour is consistent with 394 
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confirmation bias, where multiple new evidence sources are pursued to corroborate a 395 
single hypothesis. We have previously suggested, however, that an aspect of 396 
investigative expertise is an ability to judge the right time to seek evidence (Ormerod 397 
et al., 2008). Indeed, there are instances where opening evidence sources too early 398 
appears to have hindered investigations. For example, an investigation into the Soham 399 
murders (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soham_murders), where school janitor Ian 400 
Huntley was eventually convinced of killing two schoolgirls, was significantly held 401 
up by the decision to issue a media call for information, which flooded the enquiry 402 
with false leads (Bichard, 2004).  403 
Interestingly, experienced investigators documented more new evidence 404 
sources in the final quartile than less experienced investigators. In subsequent 405 
discussions, some experienced SIOs commented on using a tactic of ‘withholding the 406 
obvious’, that is, leaving some tests of a hypothesis until late into an investigation, as 407 
a final check prior to charging a person of interest with the crime. This behaviour is 408 
consistent with a disconfirmatory approach to hypothesis testing, in which a 409 
hypothesis is subjected to final challenge.  410 
The analysis of transitions between hypotheses indicates less experienced 411 
detectives remained focused on single hypotheses. In contrast, in both the early and 412 
late phases of an investigation, more experienced investigators appear to have 413 
considered multiple hypotheses in parallel. The appearance early in an investigation 414 
of multiple alternative hypotheses suggests experienced investigators are aware of the 415 
benefits of keeping an open mind. Many studies have shown that experts tend to 416 
spend longer than novices on the problem understanding phase in tackling new 417 
problems (e.g., Runco, 1994).  418 
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The reduction in the transition ratios in quartiles 2 and 3 is consistent with 419 
following up of specific hypotheses, where specific lines of enquiry have been chosen 420 
as the focus of the ongoing investigation. A return to the consideration of multiple 421 
hypotheses in the later stages of an investigation may reflect the evaluative skills of 422 
experienced investigators who, in the process of evaluating a hypothesis before acting 423 
upon it, may return to previously dismissed explanations or search for new ones. 424 
Again, a test of this possibility requires fieldwork observations. 425 
Externalisation, the process of moving knowledge or ideas from being stored 426 
internally in an individual’s memory to an external environment such as a written, 427 
diagrammatic, pictorial or auditory form has been shown to aid cognition (e.g., Cox 428 
1999).  Externalisation can influence problem-solving and decision-making (e.g., 429 
Shirouzu, Miyake, & Masukawa, 2002; Steffensen, 2013). For example, fire and 430 
rescue incident commanders trained to explicitly verbalise thinking, increased their 431 
tendency to consider goals, consequences, and displayed enhanced situation 432 
awareness without an increase in response latency (Cohen-Hatton & Honey, 2015; 433 
Cohen-Hatton, Butler & Honey, 2015). Likewise, in higher education settings, when 434 
students working in dyadic settings were encouraged to verbalise multiple hypotheses, 435 
their task performance improved (Beckmann, Beckmann, Briney & Wood, 2015).   436 
It appears from our analyses that externalisation also impacts upon criminal 437 
investigations, albeit that here externalisation was the process of completing the 438 
decision log. For example, in the drive-by shooting case, after 24 hours, the SIO 439 
documented his investigative strategy, in which he explored the complexities 440 
surrounding the initial intelligence and noted a number of alternative hypotheses that 441 
the investigation needed to entertain. A similar impact of externalisation, in this 442 
instance of the evidence held within the case, changed the course of the disappearance 443 
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investigation (Case Study 3). This type of externalised ‘exploration’ to flesh out 444 
alternative hypotheses was also reported with experienced fraud investigators 445 
(Ormerod et al., 2008). Here we also see an example of how evidence serves dual 446 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory roles if selected appropriately, consistent with 447 
Klayman and Ha’s (1987) recasting of confirmation bias as a positive test strategy.  448 
Our study has a number of key limitations, which make its findings 449 
preliminary rather than definitive. We cannot know whether officers generated more 450 
hypotheses than they actually documented. Accountability and self preservation may 451 
have hindered the documentation of hypotheses (see Waring, Alison, Cunningham, & 452 
Whitfield, 2013), or it may be that less experienced officers were simply more 453 
cautious about documentation despite conceiving of multiple hypotheses so that they 454 
would not appear uncertain or naïve. Yet, their training makes very clear that they 455 
should both generate and document alterative hypotheses. Alternatively, they may 456 
have documented fewer hypotheses because of the cognitive and time demands of 457 
doing so, which might be better managed by more experienced officers. Individual 458 
differences in time perceptions, rather than investigative experience, may also have 459 
affected hypotheses generation, as has been reported in laboratory-based research 460 
(Alison et al., 2013; Dougherty, Mathias, & Marsh, 2003). Distinguishing between 461 
these explanations will require further research that studies decision-making 462 
concurrently during ongoing investigations. Finally, although we asked the 463 
collaborating police services to provide decision logs from a mixed but representative 464 
a sample of cases, we cannot be sure that the sample was not biased by unknown 465 
selection preferences. We are reasonably confident that this potential bias was not a 466 
major concern, partly because of the wide range of cases covered, and partly because 467 
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in a number of instances the police services were not always represented in a positive 468 
light in the decision logs provided. 469 
Practical Implications 470 
The practical use of decision logs appears constrained by their format and 471 
context of use, arguably irreparably. In an environment where practice is constrained 472 
by legislation and legacy technology, it is difficult to see how decision logs can be 473 
used as collaborative decision support tools in an effective way. Replacing paper 474 
documents with online resources might overcome some of the problems, but it would 475 
not address the contextual limitation that SIOs may be cautious not to document 476 
anything that might negatively impact the prosecution case (e.g., ACPO, 1999; Tasca 477 
et al., 2012). 478 
The generic, inflexible nature of decision logs is such that rather than 479 
supporting investigators to generate multiple alternative hypotheses, they appear to 480 
constrain hypothetical thinking by encouraging SIOs to first document each decision, 481 
and then provide a rationale. Externalizing is known to support cognition, and in 482 
dynamic investigative environments the pressure to make decisions is such that the 483 
benefits of multiple hypothesis generation may not be recognized, or simply 484 
overlooked, and the decision log format does nothing to mitigate this behaviour.  485 
However, we found that experienced SIOs evidenced an ability to overcome 486 
biases in decision-making. Moreover, they documented their hypothetical thinking 487 
despite the decision log format, and were able to moderate biases in the decision-488 
making of less experienced colleagues. This would suggest that if the format of 489 
decision logs was amended to encourage more effective externalization in terms of 490 
supporting the generation of multiple hypotheses prior to making investigative 491 
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decisions, then cognitive short cuts such as satisficing and conformation bias might be 492 
better managed.      493 
 494 
 495 
Key Points 496 
• We report the first empirical investigation of the use of decision logs by senior 
police detectives. 
• The length and documentation style of decisions varied according to case type, 497 
duration and the officer involved, some choosing minimal entries, some 498 
making extensive entries. The analysis of logs indicates significant limitations 499 
of the decision log format and guidance for supporting investigative decision-500 
making.  501 
• Experienced SIOs generated more hypotheses early in the investigation and 502 
switched between considering different hypotheses more often in the initial 503 
and final phases of an investigation than inexperienced officers. Inexperienced 504 
officers opened up more evidence sources than experienced officers early in 505 
the investigation. These behaviors are consistent with higher levels of 506 
satisficing and confirmation bias by inexperienced officers, and decreased 507 
levels with experienced officers.  508 
• The practical use of decision logs appears constrained by format and context 509 
of use, arguably irreparably.  510 
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